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Abstract  
Even after about 70 years of separation, India and Pakistan continue to live in the prison of the 
past. The rhetoric of partition is still alive in the memory of the people of both the countries. They 
have constructed fixed, unchanging and competing images for each other. While Pakistan became 
an Islamic Republic, India adopted secularism, thereby, negating the two-nation theory. The 
‘differences’ along with memories of partition has made Indian and Pakistani to remain in 
permanent hostile situation. The leaders of the two countries try to settle their disputes but fails 
because of lack of support from their social and political institutions. Since its coming into power 
in 2014, the NDA government under the Indian Prime Minister, Mr. Narendra Modi has managed 
to engage the Pakistani establishment, despite many problems between the two countries. This 
article tries to highlight upon the contours of relationships post-2014. 
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Introduction 
In 1947, as a result of the partition of British 
India, India and Pakistan came into existence as 
two sovereign countries. The demand for 
partition was made on the basis of religion. The 
slogan of ‘two nation’ theory was raised by Sir 
Syed Ahmed Khan and found equal support 
from V. D. Savarkar (Savarkar, 1949). According 
to the ‘two nation’ theory, the Hindus and 
Muslims were considered two groups having 
many differences, so they cannot live together. 
In 1947, this assumption along with many other 
factors like British policy of divide-and-rule, 
power struggle among individuals and groups, 
etc. became reason for the partition of the 
British India. Since then India-Pakistan 
relationship is in flux, and has witnessed more 
bitterness than cooperation. They have 
engaged into three full wars (1948, 1965 and 
1971), one limited war (1999), and witnessed 
series of militarily tensed situations (1987, 
1990, 2002 and 2008). The military competition 
between them has led them to overtly carry 
out nuclear test in 1998, which has made the 
situation militarily dangerous. There have been 
also instances of cooperation like the two 
countries had signed Indus Water Treaty in 
1960; in 1965 they resolved their western 
border issue in Kutch (Gujarat),1  and in 1988 
they signed  an agreement to exchange their 
nuclear lists (Singh, 2001). The first two 
happened because of mediation and arbitration 
while the later was bilateral decision.   
In this paper, we make an attempt to discuss 
the developments in relationship between the 
two countries after May 2014, when the 
National Democratic Alliance (NDA) led by 
Bhartiya Janta Party (BJP) under the Prime 
Minister Mr. Narendra Modi came into power. 
This is significant because soon after winning 
the elections, the Indian Prime Minister invited 
the leaders of the South Asian countries and 
Mauritius to be a part of his swearing-in 
ceremony. He came out with a slogan 
                                                          
1 The World Bank assisted in signing of the Indus Water 
Treaty in 1960, which was signed after eight years of 
negotiations. The Kutch border dispute was settled 
through arbitration tribunal in 1965 (see, Bajwa,  2014) 
‘neighbours first’ policy. As this paper deals 
with the developments after 2014, it depends 
more on the newspaper reports, press clippings 
and opinion pieces. Here, we argue that despite 
recent incidents, India and Pakistan continue 
with their talks, instead severing all links. This 
has been possible because of political 
leaderships of the two states who, until now, 
have expressed willingness to remain engaged 
with one another at different institutional 
levels.  
Initial Steps 
Since the political situation of the country 
affects the relations between the two 
countries, BJP’s coming to power in 2014 raised 
apprehensions not only within India but also 
across the border. BJP explicitly regards itself as 
a Hindu majoritarian party. On foreign policy 
front, while in opposition, like all major 
opposition parties in India, it too supported 
‘aggressive nationalism’, especially in relation 
with Pakistan and China. Before coming to 
power, it had vehemently criticised the ruling 
United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government 
for being passive and ineffective on the front of 
Indo-Pak relations and had opposed their 
Pakistan policy (Modi Slams Manmohan Singh 
over LoC attack, 2013). Like in the past, 
Pakistan was an agenda in the election 
campaigning. The PM candidate of the BJP had 
promised to give Pakistan a "befitting" reply.  
Those who differ from the BJPs agenda were 
scornfully mentioned by party activists as 
‘agents of Pakistan’ who should be thrown 
away from India. During the general election, 
BJP leader Giriraj Singh made a statement that 
Modi’s critics will have to live in Pakistan and 
not in India (Ahmad 2014).   
However, once in power, realpolitik 2  and 
established norms regulates their behaviour. 
The Indian Prime Minister invited the political 
heads of South Asian countries in his swearing 
in ceremony. While it was largely welcomed 
                                                          
2 It means real or practical approach towards an issue. 
Many times the political leaders make chauvinist 
statements just to garner votes in election but when they 
comes into power they follows the established norms. 
Mittal and Ranjan. Space and Culture, India 2016, 4:1  Page | 8  
and all the leaders had come, this move was 
put to great analysis. It was pointed out that 
this was a clear indication that India wished to 
play an active role in South Asian politics. 
Whether it will be for the progress of South 
Asia as a region or will be an extension of the 
‘big brother’3 status of India will be revealed 
with time. The first foreign visit by the Indian 
Prime Minister to Bhutan and his assertive step 
to implement the Land Boundary Agreement4 
with Bangladesh set up a new chapter in India’s 
foreign policy, which was welcomed even by his 
detractors. 
Yet, the leadership remained clueless about its 
relationship with Pakistan. In the beginning of 
the NDA government, the relationship was 
tensed over the issue of a meeting of Pakistani 
representatives with Kashmiri separatists’ 
leaders in August 2014. The new government of 
India was against any such meeting, as a result, 
the foreign secretary level talks de-railed. After 
swearing-in ceremony the first meeting 
between the two Prime Ministers was held in 
Kathmandu during the South Asian Association 
for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) meeting in 
2014. There they discussed the issues in a hotel 
room, booked in the name of an Indian 
businessperson (Dutt, 2016). This method has 
been used by many political leaders to break an 
ice between them. It seems that at that time 
the two leaders sketched out a process of their 
engagements. Later on, in 2015, at Russian city 
Ufa during Shanghai Cooperation Organization 
(SCO) multilateral forum, the Indian and 
Pakistani Prime Ministers came out with a 
                                                          
3  The idea of ‘big brother’ has been tried to be replaced 
by ‘elder brother’. The later means a brother who also 
provides affection and love to his younger brother. The 
foreign minister of India Ms Sushma Swaraj has 
repeatedly used ‘elder brother’ instead ‘big brother’. The 
last time she used this term was in a lecture at Indian 
Council of World Affairs in March 2016 when the Prime 
Minister of Nepal K.P. Oli visited the institute. Retrieved 
from: http://www.theweek.in/news/india/india-is-nepal-
elder-brother-not-big-brother-swaraj.html  
4 The LBA protocol was signed by the Dr. Manmohan 
Singh government in 2011 to which BJP was critical, but 
once in power the Prime Minister took step to 
implement it and signed the implementation in June 
2015 in Dhaka (Ranjan, 2015). 
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), which 
called for carrying out talks. Both sides 
interpreted the MoU in their own way. For 
India, the talk was limited to terrorism while for 
Pakistan; it was for inclusion of all bilateral 
issues. Sartaz Aziz, Pakistan’s foreign policy 
adviser came to India but talks could not take 
place because no side wanted to relegate from 
its position.  
In-between such meetings and promises to 
improve the relationships, there have been 
frequent and intense border clashes wherein 
both sides claim “unprovoked firing” and assert 
victimhood. In 2015, there were terrorist 
attacks in Gurdaspur (Sehgal, 2015) and 
Udhampur (Singh, 2015) for which India had 
accused Pakistan. Similarly, there have been 
many terrorist attacks in Pakistan and likewise, 
Pakistan has accused India of funding the 
terrorists and these attacks. To take stock of 
the situation due to increase in terrorist 
activities, the Indian and Pakistani National 
Security Advisers (NSA) met in Bangkok in 
December 2015. The two NSA’s called the talks 
‘constructive’ and mentioned that the 
negotiation process will continue (Haider, 
2015a), other developments kept on 
challenging their bilateral relationship. The 
Pakistani leadership has also raised the issue of 
Kashmir in the United Nations and in the 
Organization of Islamic State (OIC) meetings. 
Diplomatic visits remain as usual, and one of 
the most notable ones being what is regarded 
as the spontaneous visit of Modi to Lahore 
while coming back from his visit to Afghanistan. 
It was reported that on 25th December, which 
is Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s birthday, Mr. 
Modi called Mr. Sharif to wish and was in turn 
invited by Sharif to his grand daughter’s 
wedding. Modi accepted and landed in 
Pakistan. It was his first visit to Pakistan. This 
visit to Pakistan, which was the first visit of an 
Indian Premiere after more than a decade, 
again took everyone by surprise. It was much 
welcomed and appreciated.  However, the 
appreciation was short-lived. Just about a week 
later, there was a terrorist attack in Pathankot 
(Punjab, India). The Pathankot attack again 
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halted the bilateral process. This was followed 
by other tragedies like the Gulshan-e-Iqbal 
Bomb blast in Lahore, the arrest of a ‘RAW 
Agent’5 and a debate on India’s interference in 
Balochistan. It is imperative to focus on these 
recent issues, understand the background, the 
claims of both sides to get a glimpse of the 
complexity that forms the Indo-Pak Conflict.  
The Pathankot Attack  
On the intervening nights of 1st and 2nd January 
2016, six terrorists attacked the Pathankot Air 
Force Station, part of the Western Air 
Command of the Indian Air Force. The terrorists 
were all dressed up in Indian Army uniforms 
and carried with them over 50 kilograms of 
ammunitions. The operation was strategically 
planned and continued for over 72 hours. All 
the six terrorists were killed. The attack claimed 
the lives of 8 people (Baweja and Sethi, 2016). 
The United Jihad Council, a Kashmiri separatist 
militant group, issued a statement taking full 
responsibility for the attack. The statement 
read (Ashiq Peerzada was the first name), 
2016): 
[The] Indian government and its media 
have been suffering from Pakistan-
phobia. By accusing Pakistan for every 
attack, India neither succeeded in the 
past to malign the Kashmir Freedom 
Struggle, nor will it get anything in the 
future through malicious propaganda. 
The attack on Pathankot Air Base from 
Kashmiri Mujhadeen carries a message 
to India that no security establishment 
and garrison are out of reach from 
militants. Instead of accusing Pakistan, 
India should read the writing on the 
wall and without wasting any time 
should provide an opportunity to the 
people of Kashmir to decide their 
future. 
However, the Indian Government believes that 
this is not done by United Jihad Council but by 
another Pakistan-based group, Jaish-e-
Mohammed (JeM). Although the JeM did not 
claim responsibility, it issued a statement 
                                                          
5 Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) is India’s spy agency. 
praising the attack (Pakistan probe: Officials 
deny JeM links to Pathankot attack, 2016). The 
National Investigation Agency (NIA) had also 
found several evidence to establish Pakistan 
link to the attack. However, Pakistan has not 
accepted these claims though it has claimed co-
operation in the investigation. Pakistani Prime 
Minister Nawaz Sharif had condemned the 
attack and had promised help to jointly tackle 
terrorism (India has given fresh evidence on 
Pathankot attack: Pakistan PM Nawaz Sharif, 
2016). Pakistan had made a special 
investigative team to probe into the Pathankot 
attack. The investigative team ruled out the 
involvement of Jaish-e-Mohammed (Pak Clears 
of Masood’s hand in Pathankot 2016). 
Although, Pakistan had arrested Jaish-e-
Mohammad chief Maulana Masood Azhar, his 
brother and several individuals belonging to 
outfit, their office was also sealed for checking. 
However, Pakistan denied getting any evidence 
to prove that Jaish-e-Mohammad was involved 
in the Pathankot Attack.   
Pakistan also appointed a Joint Investigative 
Team (JIT) that visited India to collect evidence. 
The probe team comprised of Punjab Counter 
Terrorism Department (CTD) Additional 
Inspector General of Police (IGP) Muhammad 
Tahir Rai (convener), Lahore Deputy Director 
General (DDG) Intelligence Bureau 
Mohammad Azim Arshad, Inter-Services 
Intelligence (ISI) Lt Col Tanvir Ahmed, Military 
Intelligence Lt Col Irfan Mirza and Gujjaranwala 
CTD Investigating Officer Shahid Tanveer (Pak 
forms new team to probe Pathankot attacks, 
2016). Despite evidence, the JIT alleged that 
the attack was ‘staged – managed’ by India and 
that Pakistan had nothing to do with the 
incident. An unnamed JIT member remarked: 
The attack was nothing but “vicious 
propaganda” against Pakistan, as 
Indian authorities did not have any 
evidence to back their claims. Within 
hours of the assault, all the attackers 
were shot dead by the Indian security 
forces. However, the Indian authorities 
made it a three-day drama to get 
maximum attention from the world 
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community in order to malign Pakistan 
(India rubbishes Pakistan media report 
on Pathankot terror attack, 2016). 
While India claimed that it had provided JIT 
with all the information, JIT claimed that India 
had not given them full access. They were 
denied access to the witnesses who belonged 
to the security forces.  
The Pathankot incident, the way the attack and 
the counter-operation were executed has been 
highly debated even within India. Several 
loopholes in the strategy, the way the 
intelligence and security officials worked, have 
been pointed out. Asit Jolly and Sandip 
Unnithan (2016) raised some questions on the 
negligence by the security personnel, delayed 
response even when Superintendent of Police 
of Pathankot claimed to have been kidnapped 
by terrorists, operation being called off without 
checking whether all terrorists have been killed 
even when one witness claimed that there 
were 5 terrorists and only 4 were found by the 
security agencies, lack of co-ordination, 
deployment of National Security Guards to 
protect the airbase. 
However, Dr. Rajeshwar Singh (2016), Deputy 
Director of Directorate of Enforcement, 
responded to several “unanswered questions”, 
some of which were also those asked by Jolly 
and Unnithan (2016). Singh (2016) goes on to 
challenge the claim that there was a lack of co-
ordination. He also highlighted the difficulties, 
the element of shock and challenges on the 
ground situation. He further discussed on the 
role that the media plays. In doing so, he talked 
about how the media tends to exaggerate and 
report facts without confirming. While he 
addressed the questions related to counter-
terrorist strategy, he did not talk about the 
questions that pertain to the entry and the 
negligence shown by the intelligence and 
security agency before the attack.  
Kadayam Subramaniam (2016), a former 
Director of the Research and Policy Division of 
the Indian Ministry of Home Affairs and a 
Director General of Police in Northeast India, 
argued: 
The Indian state of Punjab bordering 
Pakistan has witnessed Sikh terrorism 
and falls on the global routes of drugs 
and arms trafficking from Afghanistan 
via Pakistan. Indian police and 
paramilitary personnel deployed along 
these routes are suspected to be 
involved in these activities. Whether 
the terrorists who attacked the 
Pathankot airbase were from Pakistan 
would need detailed examination. The 
role of the serving superintendent of 
police, who was conveniently 
kidnapped by the terrorists and then 
released unharmed, is dubious and 
calls for deeper probe. (Subramaniam 
2016, no page number) 
Subramaniam (2016) asserted that the Indian 
version of the Pathankot terrorist attack 
contains many loopholes is corroborated by the 
report of the Parliamentary Standing 
Committee on the Ministry of Home Affairs 
that noted several lapses on the part of the 
Indian security forces and the government.  
The point on the nexus between drug dealers 
and police was also raised by Dr. Rajeshwar 
Singh (2016). He said: 
The ease with which the Fidayeen 
could move in Pathankot and 
commandeer the vehicle of the district 
superintendent of police also speaks 
volumes of the collusion and deep-
rooted criminal nexus between drug 
smugglers and the Pathankot police. 
(Singh, 2016: no page number) 
The JIT’s clear denial of Pakistan’s involvement 
led to a severe criticism of the Modi 
Government—The Times of India quoted, 
Anand Sharma from Congress who said: “[w]e 
had questioned the visit of the Pakistan JIT, 
which included representatives of the ISI. 
Surely, the JIT and the ISI would not have 
indicted themselves” (India rubbishes Pak 
media report, 2016).  
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The ‘RAW Agent’ 
 In March, Pakistani Newspapers reported that 
an ‘Indian spy’ named Kulbhushan Jadhav6 has 
been arrested from Balochistan. It was alleged 
that he was involved in terrorist activities in 
Pakistan. There has been a huge uproar after 
this. The Pakistani media, government and 
army have been actively highlighting this case. 
The Pakistani media published the passport of 
the suspect that claimed that he is from 
Mumbai and had a valid Iranian visa made out 
in the name of Hussein Mubarak Patel. They 
further claimed that he had joined RAW in 2013 
and was initially based in Chabahar, the port in 
Iran, which India is helping to develop. A video 
was also circulated wherein it has been claimed 
that Jadhav had confessed to be a spy. 
Pakistan’s Senate has also unanimously 
adopted a resolution asking the government to 
prepare a dossier on “Indian interference” in 
the country and send it to other nations and 
international institutions.  
After the reports, the Indian High 
Commissioner Gautam Bambawale was 
summoned by Pakistan to protest what it 
claimed was the “subversive activities”7 of a 
“RAW officer.” However, India rejected these 
claims and maintained  that the arrested 
individual has no any links with the 
Government (Razdan 2016).  
India had sought permission from the Pakistan 
Government to be allowed consular access to 
Jadhav but so far, the government has rejected. 
In response, as per media reports, their stand is 
that India could be granted ‘restricted’ consular 
access to Yadav only if some world powers 
intervened and gave certain guarantees. 
Pakistan has always accused India to be 
involved in Balochistan and interferes in the 
internal issues of Pakistan.  The arrest of the 
suspected ‘RAW Agent’ had given an 
                                                          
6 There is some confusion regarding the surname. While 
some reports call him Jadhav, others write Yadav.  
7 This phrase was used in almost all major newspapers 
reporting on the issue. See 
http://www.firstpost.com/india/eye-spy-mea-says-
yadav-was-in-the-navy-but-denies-links-to-govt-as-
pakistan-summons-envoy-2696034.html. 
opportunity to prove its allegations and claims 
about India’s involvement in Pakistan’s internal 
affairs.  
In India, there have been debates on the claim 
of Pakistan. In his analytical article, Manoj Joshi 
(2016: no page number) from Observer 
Research Foundation has given a glimpse of 
both the possibilities. The first part of the 
article rules out the possibilities of Jadhav being 
a ‘RAW Agent’. He argues that Jadhav was a 
commander-level officer, which is equivalent to 
a lieutenant colonel in the army while the 
officers who are involved in cross-border 
operations are generally of lower ranks (Joshi, 
2016). He cites the example of the ISI agents 
that have been caught by India. An important 
question that he raised was that if he indeed 
were an agent who was lurking in Pakistan 
without visa, why would he carry an Indian 
Passport? A third country passport for such 
missions is standard practice for any major 
intelligence agency. This is because it provides 
them an immediate opportunity of denial in 
case they are caught (Joshi, 2016).   
Joshi (2016) has also looked at the reverse side 
and explored the possibilities of him being an 
agent. He also rightfully argues that even if he 
is really an agent, the fact is that India will 
never accept this. No country accepts this. The 
possibility of India’s probable role in the 
Balochistan conflict also cannot be simply 
dismissed. While India has never publicly 
backed the Baloch Separatist movement, there 
are interests as well as evidence for its 
intervention (Joshi 2016).  
India and Balochistan 
Balochistan is the largest province of Pakistan. 
It comprises of 44 per cent of the total land 
mass. It has a coastline of 770 km. It shares 
borders with Iran and Afghanistan. Balochistan 
is very rich in terms of resources and is 
therefore, economically important. It is 
immensely rich in minerals and gas reserves. 
The geostrategic importance of Balochistan is 
also equally important. It offers access routes 
to Afghanistan and Central Asia and to the seas 
of Indian Ocean, South Asia and Middle East 
(Khan, 2013: 200). 
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However, Balochistan has long been a conflict 
zone. There has been a long-standing and 
widespread disillusionment and resentment 
among the people of Balochistan. According to 
Mahrukh Khan (2013), this can be attributed to 
the general view of people of Balochistan that 
“Balochistan is a part of the federation only on 
paper and is at the mercy of the State, which 
continues to exploit its natural wealth” (Khan, 
2013: 200). She notes that the current tension 
is caused by a “growing socio-economic 
insecurity and resentment due to systematic 
discriminations and oppression by the Centre” 
(Khan, 2013: 200-01).  
The problem of Balochistan, however, can be 
traced to the independence and formation of 
Pakistan. Qazi Shakeel Ahmad (2005) notes: 
The British-administered Balochistan 
constituted not more than 40 per cent 
of the total area of the province. The 
remaining 60% constitutes the former 
states of Lasbela, Kalat, Kheran and 
Mekran. According to 3 June plan, 
these states were required to seek 
accession to either Pakistan or India. 
To the great shock of Quaid-e-Azam 
Muhammed Ali Jinnah, the Khan of 
Kalat declared independence just a 
day after Pakistan emerged as an 
Independent country. (Ahmad, 2005: 
31)   
But this was not accepted by the Pakistan 
Government. The King of Kalat acceded to 
Pakistan unconditionally in March 1948. 
(Ahmad, 2005: 31) However, according to 
Mahrukh Khan (2013), the Baloch nationalism 
did not die out. In fact, it was intensified and is 
sustained by several military campaigns 
launched by Pakistan Army, the political chaos 
and oppression under different political 
regimes at the Centre and the growing 
economic disparity among the people (Khan, 
2013: 206-7). Unlike, the past the post-1999 
mobilization in Balochistan is attributed to the 
economic reasons, where the Baloch 
nationalists feel that their resources are being 
exploited by the Punjab dominated Pakistani 
power elites (Siddiqi, 2015).  
Pakistan claims that India funds militancy and 
violence in Balochistan to disrupt the China 
Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a gigantic 
project of road and railway networks linking 
China’s Xinjiang province with Gwadar port. 
Pakistan has accused India of interfering in the 
domestic affairs also to destabilize Pakistan. 
There is a tendency to blame India whenever 
there is a terror attack in Pakistan as there is a 
belief that terrorism in Pakistan is funded 
essentially by India. In this regard, in 2015, 
Pakistan’s permanent representative at the 
United Nations, Maleeha Lodhi, had handed 
over dossiers containing evidence of India’s 
involvement in Balochistan and other parts of 
the country (Manan, Abdul, Mohammad Zafar 
& Qadeer Tanoli, 2016).  
Syed Fazl-e-Haider (2015b: no page number), 
author of The Economic Development of 
Balochistan, supports the claim of Indian 
intervention in Balochistan because of strategic 
reasons. He writes: 
India’s involvement in the Balochistan 
unrest cannot be ruled out in view of 
the rapidly changing geopolitics of the 
region. India, which has ambitions of 
dominating the Arabian Sea and the 
Indian Ocean, is upset over China’s 
growing stakes in the Gwadar port. A 
fully-developed and functional Gwadar 
port near the Strait of Hormuz enables 
China to frustrate India’s dream of 
dominating regional waterways. New 
Delhi feels that the Gwadar port would 
have serious strategic implications for 
India. It perceives that it would 
empower Pakistan to control 
strategically important energy sea-
lanes on the Persian Gulf, while India 
controls no choke-points on the 
coastline of the subcontinent through 
which international shipping may pass. 
India sees Chinese involvement in 
Gwadar with suspicion and believes 
that China wants to set up bases and 
outposts across the globe to monitor 
and safeguard energy flows. 
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To support his claim he has quoted the former 
Indian naval chief, Admiral Suresh Mehta, who 
had expressed concerns over the development 
of Gwadar port in 2008 and had said: “[b]eing 
only 180 nautical miles from the exit of the 
Straits of Hormuz, Gwadar, being built in 
Balochistan coast, would enable Pakistan to 
take control over the world energy jugular and 
interdiction of Indian tankers.” (Mehta as cited 
in Haider, 2015b: no page number) India is 
developing Iran’s Chabahar port as a 
competitor to Gwadar port. India’s stake in the 
Chabahar port is aimed at gaining access to 
land-locked Afghanistan and the Central Asian 
Republics, bypassing Pakistan in transit trade 
with Iran and other countries. Mickey Kupecz 
(2012) argues that third-party sources have 
supported the claim of India’s intervention in 
domestic affairs of Balochistan. He quotes 
Christine Fair, a Pakistan Expert, who states, “It 
would be a mistake to completely disregard 
Pakistan’s regional perceptions...Indian officials 
have told me privately that they are pumping 
money into Balochistan” (Kupecz, 2012: 106). 
Manoj Joshi (2016) finds out that India has 
important strategic interests in Pakistan, 
including in the Balochistan region. According 
to Joshi, Balochistan is of interest principally 
because of the naval activities of the Chinese in 
Gwadar and the plans for the China-Pakistan 
Economic Corridor. He (Joshi, 2016) writes: 
For the past two decades, India has 
made no secret of its activities in 
Iranian Balochistan. It has sought to 
develop the port of Chabahar for 
alternative routes to Afghanistan and 
Central Asia. It has used its consulate 
in Zahedan, which is near the Pakistan 
border, to keep an eye on Pakistani 
activity there and support Indian 
interests.  
This has been re-iterated by Kanchan Gupta 
(2016), a political commentator from India. 
Gupta ruled out the possibility of a big “Indian 
conspiracy” in Balochistan due to what she 
regards as lack of political will and popular 
support. However, she referred to investment 
in the Chabahar port as “one pawn moved”. 
She also supports the intervention on moral 
grounds.   
There are many on the Indian side who may 
deny the allegations but recommends India’s 
intervention in Balochistan. While Dr. Amarjit 
Singh, an independent Security Analyst from 
India, does not say that India is already backing 
a separatist movement in Balochistan but argue 
that India should do so. In his article titled 
“How to succeed a proxy war in Balochistan” 
(Singh, 2014), he argues that like Pakistan is 
fanning several separatist movements in India, 
India should also do the same. He writes:  
So, short of an invasion of Pakistan, an 
Indian proxy war inside Pakistan must 
be expanded.  Whereas a proxy war by 
Pakistan in two Indian provinces 
merely affects less than 10% of all 
Indian provinces, a proxy war by India 
in two Pakistani provinces can affect 
40% of Pakistan.  By its sheer size, 
Pakistani resilience can be less, and 
Pakistani response to Indian proxy 
wars can be less effective.  In addition, 
the effect of proxy wars on the 
Pakistani economy can be much more 
to Pakistan than a proxy war on India 
by Pakistan. (Singh, 2014: no page 
number) 
There have been other instances that convey a 
possibility of India’s intervention in Balochistan. 
Indian Journalist and Representative of 
Pakistani newspaper Dawn, Jawed Naqvi, 
stated that there is a link and that it was 
publicly declared when the Balochistan 
Liberation Organisation (BLO), an outlawed 
organisation in Pakistan, representative 
Balaach Pardili addressed a gathering in New 
Delhi on October 4, 2016 reading out a 
statement from BLO’s exiled leader Nawabzada 
Hyrbyair Marri. The BLO had confirmed about 
the presence of its political representative in 
Delhi. Pardili who originally hails from 
Afghanistan has been living in Delhi since 2009 
and was contacted by Nawabzada Marri to 
represent him at public meetings (Naqvi, 2015).  
While India may be interfering in Balochistan, 
another important question to be asked is, to 
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what extent? Ajai Sahni (2006) argues that: 
while there are interests for and evidence of 
India’s intervention in Balochistan, it has been 
over-hyped by Pakistan.  
 Beyond the see saw game, the locals (see 
Ahmad 2014) who faces challenges of 
displacement, etc. are also opposing the port. 
This is not only a case with the Gawadar, but all 
such development projects come up at the cost 
of livelihood of local people. One of the reasons 
for opposition to CPEC is that the corridor 
would be used to exploration and 
transportation of the local resources to meet 
the needs of ‘others’. To counter resistances, 
Pakistan government has used both coercion 
and co-option (Siddiqi 2015). The Pakistan 
Army is notorious to use coercion without, 
sometimes, even knowledge of political 
leadership. One of the military intelligence 
official reportedly told an illegally detained 
politician “even if the president or chief justice 
tells us to release you, we won’t. We can 
torture you, or kill you, or keep you for years at 
our will. It is only the Army chief and the 
intelligence chief that we obey” (As cited in 
Shah 2016, 50).  
Larger Context 
These recent conflicts, however much 
unfortunate, are not new and uncommon. As 
discussed previously, the Indo-Pak relations 
have always been fluctuating. Both the States 
continue to be at loggerheads with each other. 
There is a continued legacy of hatred. Both 
continue to compete and compare themselves 
to each other, proving how they are better than 
the other. The other continues to be seen as an 
aggressive enemy. This image has not just been 
constructed but is regularly renewed through 
border clashes, policies, blame game and actual 
attacks directly or indirectly. There is a huge 
trust deficit, because of which the armies in 
both countries are subjected to heavy 
investment. India’s military prowess was a 
great matter of concern in Pakistan.  
Naveed Ahmad (2015), Pakistani Investigative 
Journalist, analyse the military investment of 
India in 2015 and the resultant worry for 
Pakistan. He writes: 
In 2015, India registered an 11% increase in 
military expenditure, with acquisition of the 
latest nuclear submarines, INS Arihant, being 
the highlight. The $3 billion strategic vessel that 
cleared all sea trials is definitely worrisome for 
Pakistan as it gives Delhi assured second-strike 
capability in a nuclear standoff. This was 
followed with the purchase of 36 Rafael fighter 
jets from France in addition to 270 Russia-made 
SU-30MKIs, making the threat more real for 
Islamabad amid no progress in composite 
dialogue – renamed after Modi government as 
comprehensive dialogue – on dispute 
resolution. (Ahmad, 2015: no page number).He 
further validates his concern by quoting that 
National Security Adviser Lieutenant General 
(Retired) Nasir Khan Janjua had also highlighted 
the same in a seminar. He argue that the 
Retired General had clearly stated that India’s 
soaring military expense threatens Pakistan’s 
and the region’s peace. 
The war industry is not a new concept in the 
context of India and Pakistan. Both India and 
Pakistan are not only buyers but are also 
suppliers of arms to various countries. There is 
also a nexus between war, military and internal 
politics. While the connection between army 
and domestic politics is more apparent in the 
case of Pakistan, armies of both countries may 
be involved in constructing the “enemy” 
beyond the border for its own interests.  
The recent conflicts can also be seen in the 
larger political context of Pakistan. The timing 
of the arrest of Indian spy suspect and 
revelation of RAW agents in Balochistan can be 
seen in view of the disturbance between the 
Civil Government and Military. There has been 
a growing resentment between Prime Minister 
Nawaz Sharif and Army Chief Raheel Sharif. 
Pakistani Journalist and Analyst, Najam Sethi 
(2016) has stated several reasons underlying 
this resentment that include Nawaz Sharif’s 
apparently Pro-Indian stand, inefficient political 
policies, inept policy on Taliban, among other 
reasons.  
After the Gulshan-e-Iqbal blast, the Army Chief 
Raheel Shareef did not seek permission from 
the Prime Minister to start search operations in 
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Punjab. He had also refused any joint action 
with the police while the army is responsible 
for the areas beyond Punjab (General Raheel 
denies joint action with police, 2016).  The 
name of the family members of Nawaz Sharif in 
the Panama Leak case was like another nail in 
the coffin. Akbar Notezai (2016) notes that the 
recent pro-activeness of the Army on the issue 
of rooting corruption may be an indication that 
there is trouble ahead for the civilian 
government or atleast for Nawaz Sharif.  
M Ilyas Khan (2016) also argue in the case of 
the Indian spy that the assertiveness by Army 
can be seen as a sign of the Pakistani army's 
growing willingness to be seen to be dictating 
the country's foreign and national security 
policies. He further argue, “[i]t comes as the 
army tries to face the triple threat of the 
Pakistani Taliban, Baloch insurgents and a 
complicated mix of urban crime, ethnic, 
linguistic, religious, sectarian and political 
rivalries in the country's biggest city, Karachi.” 
(Khan, 2016: no page number) 
Khan (2016) argues that it also indicates a 
toughening of Pakistan's position against India 
at a time when the Pakistani army is emerging 
as one of the chief guarantors of peace in 
Afghanistan, in partnership with China. Any 
failure to deliver on this score is likely to 
weaken Afghan President Ashraf Ghani, an 
apparent ally of Pakistan, and strengthen pro-
India forces in Kabul.   
Conclusion 
The India-Pakistan relationship is such that any 
predication or possibility can fail. In the past, a 
number of times the two countries have started 
a structured dialogue but have failed to 
conclude it. Due to the nature of their bilateral 
relationship, many times it seems that a 
nuclear war can trigger but till now a rational 
thinking has prevented such untoward incident. 
One such situation was Mumbai attack in 2008. 
The then government under Dr. Manmohan 
Singh handled the situation calmly. However, 
the rise of neo-nationalism will keep on putting 
its political leadership under test; and any 
untoward incident may put pressure for all-out 
attack, at that time, it is to watch how power 
elites behave.  
The relationship between the two countries can 
be in ‘workable’ situation if they continue to 
engage in dialogue. The continuity may not 
always provide result, because of their 
relationship; it will certainly help in building 
certain mechanisms to ‘cool off’ tensions. They 
can be of immense help during tensed time. In 
this light, despite so many problems the foreign 
secretaries of India and Pakistan met in May 
2016. 
Both countries have their trouble spots due to 
historical and political reasons. These spots 
provide soft points for various actors to play 
their own game, which have repercussions on 
India-Pakistan relationships.  
Finally, against the perception, the present 
government in India is taking positive steps to 
keep the two countries engaged. It is doing so 
despite being criticised by many, including its 
own party members. The surprised visit by the 
Indian Prime Minister may be criticised but was 
a positive gesture. He also made the efforts to 
keep the two countries on talking board despite 
the incidents like in Pathankot and Gurdaspur. 
The Pakistani political establishment too has 
reacted positively without falling in the lines of 
radical elements that are against any form of 
engagements with India. 
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